What Can the Research on Chinese Bureaucracy Do for Organization Theory?
梳理中英文文献，从代理问题与激励、政策执行中的关系运用、官僚制内部可变耦合三方面，总结中国官僚制研究对组织理论发展的启示。
Abstract Chinese bureaucracy – the organizational apparatus of Chinese governments – has played a significant role in China’s economic development and political control in the post-Mao era. In this paper, we draw on research on Chinese bureaucracy in both English and Chinese to highlight major findings in three areas: agency problems and incentive provision, the use of guanxi in policy implementation, and variable coupling among different parts of the bureaucracy. These three aspects are interrelated: agency problems induce the prevalence of informal institutions as an organizational response, which leads to variable coupling in Chinese bureaucracy. We discuss the issues and implications this literature presents for the further development of organization theory and the emerging research agenda.