Welfare effects of jointly managed non-targeted advertising in multi-sided media markets
研究两家竞争性媒体平台联合销售非定向广告对消费者福利和总福利的影响，发现联合广告总是降低消费者福利，但总福利可能因广告干扰成本处于中间范围而提高。
We examine the welfare effects of joint advertising by two competing media platforms that attract viewers through subscription pricing while also generating revenue by selling advertisers access to their subscriber base. Focusing on non-targeted advertising, we show that while joint advertising consistently reduces consumer welfare, its overall impact on total welfare remains uncertain. Crucially, this effect depends on the nuisance cost of advertising to consumers, with total welfare potentially increasing when this cost falls within an intermediate range. • Competitive effects of jointly managed non-targeted advertising are investigated. • Subscription fees fall, as platforms pass ad revenue gains to consumers. • Independent platforms under-advertise relative to the social optimum. • Joint ad levels vary with how consumers perceive advertising annoyance. • Total welfare improves when ad nuisance costs are at intermediate levels.