Unintended Consequences of ‘The Plan for Growth’: Earnings Management in the United Kingdom
利用2006-2015年英国上市公司数据，研究发现2011年《增长计划》旨在减轻监管负担以促进增长，却意外导致企业通过增加异常应计项目进行盈余管理，并伴随现金流下降、股权成本上升和避税行为。
ABSTRACT Using public UK firm data for 2006–2015, I examine whether a government policy can unintentionally promote earnings management. The Plan for Growth 2011 aims to reduce the overall burden of regulation on businesses to help them grow faster. Motivated by such higher growth expectations , opportunistic executives can manage earnings to hit those growth targets. Consistent with this view, I find that firms increase abnormal accruals after the reforms, while the firm‐level growth expectations rise. Regarding the economic impact, these firms experience lower cashflows, higher equity cost, and tax avoidance. I also provide suggestive evidence for corporate fraud after the reform.