Does Banking Competition Compromise the Role of Bank Monitoring in the Capital Market? Evidence From Firm‐Specific Tail Risk
利用美国州际银行分支法律放松管制的交错实施，研究发现银行业竞争加剧导致企业未来股价崩盘风险上升，支持了竞争削弱银行监督、助长坏消息囤积的观点。
ABSTRACT We exploit the staggered deregulation of interstate bank branching laws across US states and study the impact of banking competition on managerial manipulative behaviour. We find compelling evidence that firms experience an increase in future stock price crash risk following deregulation events. It is consistent with the view that increased banking competition compromises the role of bank monitoring, thus facilitating bad news hoarding. Further evidence shows that the impact of banking competition on crash risk is salient for firms with weak director social connections and chief executive officers with limited outside opportunities.