Rational gridlock
研究了当倡导者拥有议程设置权且可改革的法律随机时，最优立法机构设计如何平衡僵局成本与改革温和性，发现两极分化且不具代表性的双机构最有利于选民。
Abstract We examine the design of lawmaking institutions when advocates have agenda setting power and there is randomness in the status quo laws eligible for reform. The institutional designer maximizes voter welfare. We find that the optimal arrangement consists of two lawmaking institutions that must agree to enact any reforms. The institutions do not share preferences with one another or with the median voter. As a result, gridlock arises: the institutions reject some reforms that the median voter favors. However, when reform succeeds, it tends to be modest in scope and to more closely track what the median voter prefers. The optimal institutional design trades off the cost of failing to change law due to gridlock against the benefit of forcing advocates to moderate their proposals and offer more centrist reforms. Surprisingly, voters are best served by a pair of polarized and unrepresentative institutions.