Bargaining Foundations for Price Taking in Matching Markets
研究了在匹配市场中，代理人先进行不可签约的投资，再通过讨价还价决定匹配对象和交易条件。发现只要市场始终存在最低限度的竞争，当贴现因子趋近于1时，所有人都会成为价格接受者，从而激励社会最优的投资。
ABSTRACT Agents make noncontractible investments before bargaining over who matches with whom and their terms of trade. An agent is a price taker when her investments do not change her potential partners' payoffs. This incentivizes socially optimal investments. Across a variety of noncooperative bargaining models featuring dynamic entry, we show that everyone necessarily becomes a price taker as the discount factor goes to 1 if there is a minimal amount of competition always present in the market. If this condition is not satisfied, dynamic entry need not create enough competition to guarantee price taking even if agents are arbitrarily patient.