Bargaining with binary private information
研究了卖方与买方在买方估值只有高低两种可能时的讨价还价，构建了有限期和无限期下的全部均衡，发现高估值概率大时卖方持续要高价导致交易集中在初期和截止期，并分析了估值变化和卖方承诺能力的影响。
This paper examines bargaining between a seller and a buyer with a binary private valuation. The seller offers a price to the buyer in each period. We explicitly construct the complete equilibrium set via an induction argument both for the finite and infinite horizon cases. When the horizon is finite and the probability of a high buyer valuation is large, the seller consistently charges a high price, resulting in trade bursts at the outset and deadline, with constant trade rates in between. We also show that the seller may be worse off when the low buyer's valuation increases and that the buyer may be better off when the seller has commitment than when not. We relate our results to previous findings on bargaining with two-sided offers.