Corporate governance, board networks and firm performance
基于代理理论和资源依赖理论，利用印度2689家上市公司的面板数据，发现董事会独立性、两职分离和家族所有权正向影响企业绩效，且董事会网络中心性高的企业表现更好，但家族所有权和强网络关系会削弱董事会独立性的正面作用。
This study revisits the corporate governance–firm performance relationship using a multi-theoretic framework, drawing on agency theory and resource dependence theory (RDT). Focusing on emerging market firms in India, I argue that the benefits of board independence, traditionally emphasized for monitoring and resource access roles, are contingent upon other governance mechanisms and network structures. Using a longitudinal dataset of 2689 publicly listed firms in India, I find that board independence, separation of the CEO and board chair roles and family ownership positively influence firm performance. Additionally, firms with greater board network centrality perform better, accessing vital financial, institutional, and knowledge resources. Importantly, the findings reveal that the positive effects of board independence are diminished in the presence of high family ownership and strong board network ties, suggesting a contingency-based governance-performance relationship. This study contributes to corporate governance literature by highlighting the contextual nature of governance effectiveness in emerging markets.