Antisocial learning
研究社会困境中的社会学习模型，发现独立学习率低时信念不收敛但合作高效，减少行为公开性可促进学习但降低合作；独立学习率高时信念收敛且几乎无人合作，有限隐私可增加合作。
Abstract I study a model of social learning within a social dilemma. Some agents independently learn how to profit from a socially harmful action, the rest can only infer this information from public behavior. In all equilibria, if the rate of independent learning is sufficiently low, then beliefs do not converge. Yet, this is asymptotically efficient: almost all agents cooperate. In this case, reducing the publicity of actions can increase social learning and reduce cooperation. However, if the rate of independent learning is high, then beliefs converge to the truth and almost nobody cooperates. Here, allowing limited privacy can increase cooperation.