The Value of Political Geography: Evidence from the Redistricting of Firms
利用美国选区重划周期对政治地图的冲击，研究发现企业被重新分配到两党竞争激烈的选区会遭受损失，且影响不依赖于同一政治家连任。
We demonstrate that political geography has value to firms. We do so by exploiting shocks to political maps that occur around redistricting cycles in the United States. At one extreme, these shocks keep some firms in congressional districts that are largely unchanged and, at the other extreme, reassign some firms to largely different sets of constituents. Our main finding is that firms suffer from being reassigned to districts that are competitive across parties relative to safer districts. The effects are not trivial in magnitude. Moreover, they do not depend on whether firms continue to be represented by the same politician after the next election.