Revealed types and beliefs in bayesian games
研究了贝叶斯博弈中玩家可能对对手类型持有错误信念时的行为，提出了四个条件来刻画其行为，并说明如何从跨博弈的加总行为中识别类型分布和共同信念，以及仅用行动数据检验信念是否准确。
Abstract This paper examines players’ behavior in Bayesian games when they may have incorrect beliefs about their opponents’ types. Their behavior can be characterized by a type distribution function and a belief function if their actions across games satisfy four conditions: Dominance, Monotonicity, Continuity, and Linearity. Both the type distribution function and players’ shared belief can be identified from their aggregate behavior across games. The analyst can also test if players’ beliefs are accurate with action data only.