Information Aggregation in Stratified Societies
研究了分层社会中精英如何内生形成以聚合信息并影响未获充分信息的中间选民的选择，分析了精英规模和信息聚合程度如何取决于中间选民对精英建议的遵循程度。
Abstract We analyse a model of political competition in which the elite form endogenously to aggregate information and advise the uninformed median voter which candidate to choose. The median voter knows whether or not the endorsed candidate is biased toward the elites, but might still prefer the biased candidate if the elite’s endorsement provides sufficient information about her competence. The elite size and the degree of information aggregation by the elite depend on the extent to which the median voter follows the elite’s advice. A higher cost of redistribution minimises the elite’s information advantage, hinders information transmission and decreases the expected competence of the elected politician.