An analytical model of search and bargaining with divisible money
提出了一个带有可分货币的标准搜索与讨价还价模型，分析了均衡的存在性、讨价还价权力对货币持有分布和经济效率的影响，并研究了再分配货币转移和临时货币扩张对福利的改善作用。
We propose a standard search and bargaining model with divisible money, in which only the random matching market opens and the generalized Nash bargaining settles each trade. Assuming fixed production costs, we analytically characterize a tractable equilibrium, called a pay‐all equilibrium , and prove its existence. Each buyer pays all the money holding as a corner solution to the bargaining problem and each seller produces a positive amount of goods as an interior solution. The bargaining power parameter affects the distribution of the money holdings and possibly induces economic inefficiency. We propose a redistributional monetary transfer that adjusts the bargaining outcome and improves the allocation efficiency. Moreover, we analyze a temporary expansion of the money supply that increases social welfare through a redistribution.