Random utility coordination games on networks
研究了网络上的二元协调博弈，其中每个代理人根据邻居中采取相同行动的比例与个人随机阈值比较来选择行动，定义了随机效用主导结果并证明其均衡存在性与稳健性。
We study static binary coordination games with random utility played on networks. In equilibrium, each agent chooses an action only if a fraction of her neighbors choosing the same action is higher than an agent‐specific i.i.d. threshold. A fuzzy convention x is a profile where (almost) all agents choose the high action if their threshold is smaller than x and the low action otherwise. The random‐utility (RU) dominant outcome x * is a maximizer of an integral of the distribution of thresholds. The definition generalizes Harsanyi–Selten's risk dominance to coordination games with random utility. We show that, on each sufficiently large and fine network, there is an equilibrium that is a fuzzy convention x * . On some networks, including a city network, all equilibria are fuzzy conventions x * . Finally, fuzzy conventions x * are the only behavior that is robust to misspecification of the network structure.