Auctioning Control and Cash‐Flow Rights Separately
研究在拍卖中，将资产的控制权和现金流权分配给不同竞拍者（如最高出价者得现金流、次高出价者得控制权）能否提高卖方收入，发现当竞拍者信号相近时，分离权利能降低信息租金从而增加收入。
We consider a classical auction setting in which an asset/project is sold to buyers who privately receive signals about expected payoffs, and payoffs are more sensitive to a bidder's signal if he runs the project than if another bidder does. We show that a seller can increase revenues by sometimes allocating cash‐flow rights and control to different bidders, for example, with the highest bidder receiving cash flows and the second‐highest receiving control. Separation reduces a bidder's information rent, which depends on the importance of his private information for the value of his awarded cash flows. As project payoffs are most sensitive to a bidder's information if he controls the project, allocating cash flow to another bidder lowers bidders' informational advantage. As a result, when signals are close, the seller can increase revenues by splitting rights between the top two bidders.