Games with information constraints: Seeds and spillovers
研究了不完全信息博弈中两种信息约束（种子和溢出）对均衡结果的影响，推导出中介无法直接或私下沟通时的“显示原理”，并应用于最优组织设计问题。
We study equilibrium behavior in incomplete‐information games under two information constraints: seeds and spillovers. The former restricts which agents can initially receive information. The latter specifies how this information spills over to other agents. Our main result characterizes the equilibrium outcomes under these constraints, without making additional assumptions about the agents' initial information. This involves deriving a “revelation‐principle” result for settings in which a mediator cannot communicate directly or privately with the agents. Our model identifies which spillovers are more restrictive and which seeds are more impactful. We apply our results to a problem of optimal organization design.