Why does temporary work increase disability insurance inflow?
研究发现，固定期限合同工人比永久工人更可能申请并获得残疾保险，原因在于生病时雇主支持不足和劳动力市场前景较差，而非健康风险或人员选择差异。
We show that workers with fixed-term contracts are substantially more likely to apply for and be awarded disability insurance (DI) benefits than permanent workers. We study whether this differential can be explained by (i) selection of worker types into contracts, (ii) the relation between contract type and the risk of illness, (iii) differences in employer support during illness, and (iv) differences in labour market prospects of ill workers. We find that selection actually masks part of the differential, whereas the impact of contract type on health is limited. In contrast, the difference in employer support during illness is a significant cause of the heightened DI risk of temporary workers, especially in slack labour markets. We therefore conclude that, conditional on being ill, workers with fixed-term contracts face different support structures and incentives that make them more likely to ultimately apply for and be awarded DI. • Temporary employees have higher risks of applying for Disability Insurance (DI). • The higher DI risk is not caused by compositional differences. • Instead, limited employer responsibilities during illness are important. • Worse labour market prospects of sick temporary workers also play an important role.