Scarf's, Shapley's, and Shubik's Applications of the “Core” to General Equilibrium
利用档案和未公开信件，讲述了Scarf、Shapley和Shubik在1950-60年代如何将合作博弈的“核”概念用于证明一般均衡，以及他们后来为何对此感到悲观。
Abstract In the 1950s and 1960s, Herbert Scarf, Lloyd Shapley, and Martin Shubik adapted the concept of the “core” from cooperative game theory as a basis for proofs of general equilibrium. Application of the core to equilibrium is an early instance of the meeting of game theory and economics, and one where game theory was aimed at a “big question” in economic theory. This development was seen as a major step forward for economic theory and was met with enthusiasm by economic theorists at the time. This article uses archival resources and unpublished correspondence between Scarf, Shapley, and Shubik to provide an account of their development of applications of the core to general equilibrium. Research in economic theory eventually shifted away from the core and equilibrium as the general equilibrium research program declined and noncooperative game theory became the favored approach to modeling interaction. However, Scarf and Shubik moved on from the core and equilibrium and grew pessimistic toward it (and related concepts) in the decades that followed for reasons that differ from the broader trends in the field. It is shown that Scarf's and Shubik's evolving views can be attributed to subtle and unwelcome features of the concept of the core and general equilibrium.