Strategic Flip‐Flopping in Political Competition
研究候选人在选举中根据选民偏好信息调整立场的行为，发现调整成本足够高时候选人会预先偏离中间选民，以在有利信息出现时低成本获胜。
ABSTRACT We study candidates' position adjustments in response to information about voters' preferences. Repositioning allows candidates to move closer to the median voter, but it incurs financial and electoral costs. In a subgame‐perfect equilibrium, candidates diverge from the center ex ante if the costs of adjustment are sufficiently large. This allows them to increase the chances of a costless victory when the information is strongly in their favor. Our theory highlights a dynamic of moderation during the campaign stage in competitive elections, as well as a prominent role for minor adjustments made preemptively by the favored candidate.