Public Listing Choice with Persistent Hidden Information
研究了企业无形性如何放大CEO的持续私有信息并降低企业公开上市倾向，通过模型和实证发现私有现金流比有形现金流持续性高63%，若无形性回到1980年水平，上市倾向将增加5个百分点，CEO可变薪酬增长下降61%。
Abstract How much does firm intangibility amplify CEOs’ persistent private information and reduce firms’ public listing propensity? We develop a model of competing public and private investors financing firms heterogeneously exposed to persistent private cash flows. Equilibrium financing is driven by information rent differentials in CEO compensation. We validate and structurally estimate the model using firm listing and CEO compensation data. We find private (intangible) cash flows exhibit 63% higher persistence than their tangible counterparts. Further, if firm intangibility levels returned to those of 1980, mean listing propensities would increase 5 percentage points while mean CEO variable pay growth would decrease by 61%.