Corporate misconduct in Japan: a view from comparative corporate governance
研究了日本公司治理转型对企业不当行为的影响，发现外国机构投资者引入的股东逻辑会增加不当行为，而传统利益相关者逻辑则相反，对理解不同治理模式的后果有参考价值。
Abstract This study investigates the factors affecting corporate misconduct by examining the transformation of corporate governance in Japan. We hypothesize that the traditional Japanese business system, which adheres to stakeholder logic, is less prone to misconduct, whereas the infusion of shareholder logic by foreign institutional investors increases the likelihood of corporate misconduct. We test our hypotheses using a sample of Japanese firms from 2009 to 2013. The results indicate that foreign ownership is positively associated with corporate misconduct. Furthermore, under stakeholder logic, long CEO tenure mitigates the effect of foreign ownership on misconduct while, under shareholder logic, stock options intensify this effect. This study highlights that incompatible corporate governance practices may have negative consequences for corporate behavior.