CFO overconfidence, environmental violations, and firm performance. The moderating role of constituency statutes
研究发现过度自信的CFO更易导致企业环境违规，进而损害长期绩效；但利益相关者法规能缓解这一负面效应，同时违规罚款也会加重惩罚。
Abstract This study examines the relationship between Chief Financial Officer (CFO) overconfidence and firm performance through the lens of environmental violations and constituency statutes. Drawing on stakeholder and upper echelons theories, we find that firms with overconfident CFOs are more likely to commit environmental violations, which negatively impact their long‐term performance. Our empirical evidence suggests that this effect can be moderated by the introduction of constituency statutes and violation penalties. Notably, firms with overconfident CFOs may benefit more from stakeholder‐oriented laws while also incurring higher penalties for environmental violations.