Cooperative TU-games: Dominance, stable sets, and the core revisited
提出一种新的占优关系，使得由此定义的稳定集总是存在且唯一，并在核心非空时与之重合，适用于投票博弈等核心通常为空的博弈类。
Stable sets are introduced by von Neumann and Morgenstern (1944) as “the solution” of a cooperative game. Later on, Gillies (1953) defines the core of the game. Both notions can be established in terms of dominance. It is well known that the core may be an empty set, whereas stable sets may fail to exist, or may produce different proposals. We provide a new dominance relation so that the stable set obtained when applying this notion (the -stable set) always exists, it is unique, and it coincides with the core of the cooperative game, whenever the core is not empty. We apply this concept to some particular classes of -games having typically an empty core: voting (majority) games, minimum cost spanning trees games with revenue, controlled capacitated networks, or -sequencing games.