Spillover effects of creditor rights on corporate payout policy
利用美国反重分类法律实施的差异，研究发现增强债权人权利会显著增加企业分红，尤其对融资受限、治理差、信息不透明的公司影响更大，表明改善一方利益相关者权利可惠及其他方。
Abstract We use exogenous changes in creditor rights from staggered enactments of anti‐recharacterization laws to show that enhanced creditor rights lead to economically significant increases in dividend payments. This impact is more pronounced for firms that are financially constrained, poorly governed, informationally opaque, and prone to agency problems. Our detailed loan‐contract results show that stronger creditor rights provide greater access to credit markets, and it is through this channel that firms are able to redirect more funds toward shareholder payouts. Overall, our findings suggest that improving the rights of one stakeholder can create positive spillover effects for other stakeholders.