Optimizing defensive resource allocation in layered systems under the coexistence of strategic and non-strategic risks
研究了学校、机场等分层安全系统在同时面临战略性和非战略性攻击者时，如何通过优化资源配置来降低风险，发现加强外层防御和采用混合模型比纯博弈模型更有效。
Many security systems, such as schools, airports, and public transit, are characterized by multiple layers, where layers are interconnected against various types of attacks. In the literature, there is a lack of studies focusing on how to protect layered systems through optimal resource allocation in the presence of strategic and non-strategic attackers. To address this research gap, this paper makes an initial attempt to study the defensive resource allocation problem in layered systems against the co-existence of strategic and non-strategic risks. Specifically, we develop a novel hybrid resource allocation model, and examine the robustness of the model considering two false beliefs of the defender. We provide numerical illustrations using the real data from U.S. school shootings. Our findings suggest that the defender would benefit from layered structures in a system and achieve lower risks by strengthening the outer layers, as it provides extra levels of defense for the inner layers. The results also show that the pure game theoretic model built solely upon strategic risks may not always the preferred choice for guiding resource allocation, especially when the probability of the attacker being non-strategic is high. This highlights the importance of using the hybrid model to account for the behaviors of attackers.