Data provision to an informed seller
研究了垄断卖方已私下不完全了解买方价值时，数据提供者如何向卖方提供额外信息，并发现当买方价值为二元时，只能实现向所有卖方类型提供相同信息的结果，进而刻画了可实现的福利权衡。
A monopoly seller is privately and imperfectly informed about the buyer's value of the product. A designer can provide the seller with additional information, which the seller uses to price discriminate the buyer. We demonstrate the difficulty of screening the seller's information: When the buyer's value is binary, no combination of buyer surplus and seller profit can be implemented other than those achieved by providing the same information to all seller types. We use the result to characterize the set of implementable welfare outcomes and demonstrate the trade-off between buyer surplus and efficiency.