Guardrails on the Creative Process: The Impact of Decision Rights and Incentives on Creativity
研究发现在绩效挂钩薪酬下，员工若无权决定自己的创意作品是否进入下一轮，其创造力反而更高；固定薪酬下决策权无显著影响。
ABSTRACT Our study investigates how decision-making rights—specifically, the prerogative of identifying which of one’s own creative products advances for consideration—affect employee creativity under performance-dependent and fixed compensation. Drawing on the dual-process perspective of creativity and satisficing behavior, this study proposes that employees without decision rights over the selection of their creative output exhibit superior creative performance when compensated based on the creativity of their output, as opposed to their counterparts with such decision rights. In fixed compensation settings, decision rights do not have a discernible effect on creative outcomes. Decision rights under performance-dependent compensation prompt employees to engage in less divergent thinking, more convergent thinking, and to exhibit satisficing behavior that ultimately curtails the production of creative work. This study demonstrates how structuring decision rights and aligning them with compensation systems can enhance creative performance, providing organizations with actionable insights for fostering innovation while maintaining managerial control. Data Availability: Contact the authors. JEL Classifications: D91; M41; M49; O31.