Legislative Hearings and Presidential Cabinet Management
研究立法听证会如何影响总统对内阁成员的管理，发现能力型官员更易留任，忠诚型官员更易晋升，且能力型官员所在部门绩效更好。
ABSTRACT We examine how legislative hearings, mandatory in the appointment process for top executives, shape presidential management of cabinet. Research on legislative confirmation suggests that such a requirement generates a trade‐off in choosing between loyalty and competence types. Building on this insight, we argue that the appointees' career paths after entering presidential cabinets differ significantly after legislative hearings are adopted, according to which type they are. Using a quasi‐experimental identification strategy, we analyze original data on the careers of over 560 ministers from South Korea appointed pre‐ and post‐hearings. We find that competence types are more likely to be retained than loyalty types after legislative hearings. However, loyalty types are more likely to receive promotion—that is, transfer from their initial cabinet appointment to a higher‐prestige post—than competence types after legislative hearings. Additionally, we find that agency performance is better under competence types than under loyalty types.