Regulatory leniency and the cost of deposits
研究发现，银行监管越宽容，银行风险承担越大，导致未保险存款成本上升，且对风险较高的银行和存款人议价能力更强时更显著。
Abstract We examine whether variation in regulatory leniency is associated with the cost of deposits in the banking industry. We predict that lenient regulatory supervision allows for greater bank risk-taking due to delayed intervention, resulting in a higher cost of deposits. Our main finding is a positive association between banks’ cost of uninsured deposits and the leniency of their state regulators, incremental to observable measures of risk and performance. We further show that this result is stronger for riskier banks and when uninsured depositors have a greater ability or incentive to influence deposit rates. These findings suggest that the leniency of bank regulators is priced in uninsured deposit rates and further our understanding of the factors associated with regulatory leniency in the banking industry.