Monnet Reversed: The Intergovernmental Solutions of the Poly‐Crises
本文分析了2009年后欧盟在主权债务、疫情、能源和安全等多重危机中采用的治理逻辑，发现危机推动了欧盟一体化，但强化了政府间主义而非超国家主义，国家政府角色进一步凸显。
The article aims to detect the governance logic adopted by the European Union (EU) during the post-2009 crises (sovereign debt crisis, pandemic crisis, energy and security crises) and its policy consequences.1 The argument is that the crises of the post-2009 led to an increase in EU integration, but not to the EU supranationalisation. Those crises were dealt with through intergovernmental and not supranational governance, whose policy outcome further strengthened national governments' role in policy-making. The approach here adopted is empirical, based on the analysis of the crises of the post-2009 period (defined as poly-crises by the literature, Zeitlin et al., 2019). The empirical analysis of the poly-crises confirmed what Fabbrini and Puetter (2016) argued quasi-10 years ago, namely, that the process of integration faces a paradox, with a pressure towards a deeper integration and national governments engaged in channelling that pressure to their advantage. The poly-crises of the 2010s and 2020s are spectacular testimony to that paradox. Those crises asked for finding common solutions, but it was national governments that devised them. In the last 15 years, the integration process proceeded firmly, but it moved towards an intergovernmental and not supranational direction. The intergovernmental thrust was certainly justified by the nature of the crises, since all of them were close to core state power policies (Genschel and Jachtenfuchs, 2014), but it reflected also the pre-eminent role acquired by intergovernmental governance in the process of integration after the 2009 Lisbon Treaty. In August 1954, Jean Monnet said something that became an unchallengeable truth in pro-European thinking, that is, ‘Europe will be forged in crises, and will be the sum of the solutions adopted for these crises’ (Duchene, 1994). Monnet assumed that the solution of a crisis would have led to an increase of decision-power of supranational actors (the Commission in particular). However, the differentiation in EU governance makes Monnet's phrase highly problematic. As Anghel and Jones (2023, p. 767) noted, ‘any argument that Europe is forged through crisis is unlikely to tell us much about what Europe is or where it may be headed’. In fact, considering supranational and intergovernmental logics, it would be necessary to specify which form of governance is favoured ‘by the solution adopted for the crisis’ in question. This can in fact lead to an acceleration of the integration process in either a supranational or intergovernmental direction. Indeed, the crises of the 2010s and 2020s favoured an intergovernmental, rather than supranational, integration of the EU. The article will be organised as follows. First, it will define the EU structure of governance, in its supranational and intergovernmental components, for thus conceptualising the post-2009 poly-crises. Second, it will compare the poly-crises for showing their varied nature but similar impact on EU governance, namely, the strengthening of the intergovernmental logic. Third, it will discuss the implications of the intergovernmental logic for the EU effectiveness and legitimacy. The Conclusion will bring home a few crucial points on the EU and its integration logic. For many scholars (Börzel, 2016; Christiansen, 2020; Dinan, 2011; Hix, 2005), the distinction between intergovernmentalism and supranationalism is questionable. In policy-making processes, it is argued, that distinction is blurred, with the institutions playing different roles in different contexts. Indeed, the then German chancellor, Angela Merkel, in a speech given on 2 November 2010 for the opening ceremony of the 61st academic year of the College of Europe in Bruges, assessed that ‘the Lisbon Treaty has placed the institutional structure (of the EU) on a new foundation’, to the point of replacing the traditional distinction between the ‘Community and the “Intergovernmental methods”’. She added that the EU is already working according to a ‘new Union method’, consisting of ‘coordinated action in a spirit of solidarity’. However, things did not turn out as she, and many others, had expected. The poly-crises of the post-Lisbon period have not only hardened the confrontation between the two decision-making regimes, but they also showed the pre-eminence acquired by national governments in dealing with them. The 2009 Lisbon Treaty institutionalised an area where governance takes place in the EU, consisting of different decision-making logics that give form to a specific compound system (Fabbrini, 2010, 2015). According to the Treaty, four institutions participate in the (political) decision-making process, two on both the executive and legislative sides. On the executive side are the European Commission (hereinafter, the Commission) and the European Council; on the legislative side are the Council of Ministers (hereinafter the Council) and the European Parliament (hereinafter the EP, 705 members elected in the 27 member states, which have become 720 as from 2024), although some configurations of the Council play, in specific policies, an executive role too (as the Eurogroup, a section of the Economic and Financial Affairs Council or ECOFIN, and the Foreign Affairs Council). Moreover, regulatory agencies and institutions, such as the European Central Bank, affect the decision-making process, but they are technocratic and not political institutions (although their decisions might have political effects). It was with the 1992 Maastricht Treaty that the EU internally institutionalised different decision-making regimes (or pillars), a supranational one for single market regulatory policies and an intergovernmental one for strategic policies, traditionally close to the heart of national sovereignty (core state powers such as security, foreign affairs and defence, home affairs and political asylum, fiscal policy, but also health, energy and military aid policies, Genschel and Jachtenfuchs, 2014). The same institutions play different roles in different policies through different inter-institutional frameworks. The Lisbon Treaty abolished the pillar structure, but it preserved the decision-making differentiation. In supranational governance, which was prefigured in the 1957 Rome Treaties and then clarified with the Single European Act of 1986, the Commission monopolises legislative initiative, whilst the Council and then (since 1979) the EP have the power whether or not to approve (with differing majorities amongst them) the proposals (regulations and directives) put forward by the Commission, with the European Council of heads of state and government called on to intervene only when disputes emerge on politically sensitive issues. This decision-making regime was enhanced by various Treaties approved after 1992, up to becoming, in the Lisbon Treaty, the ordinary legislative procedure (Dehousse, 2011). In supranational governance, none of the institutions involved has the possibility to stop the decision-making process, nor is any national minister in the Council endowed with veto power. Certainly, the search for consensus constitutes the public philosophy of the policy-making process, but decisions can, however, be reached through a majoritarian logic. From one election to another, national governments or members of the EP can change their policy position, but none of them can stop the policy-making process. Instead, in intergovernmental governance (Bickerton et al., 2015a), decisions on core state power policies are rarely of a legislative (but, rather, political) nature and are taken based on the initiative by one or other national government (rather than by the Commission). The decision-making process is co-ordinated by the Council and the European Council, with the Commission acting as a supporting structure, and the EP sidelined in the decision-making process (it is informed of the decisions taken but rarely has the chance to approve or reject them). Policy co-ordination can register different degrees of congruence, tight in fiscal and budgetary policies, moderate in health policy and loose in energy and security policies. Nevertheless, voluntary co-ordination is the logic of the game, not legal imposition (Puetter, 2014). In integration through law (supranational governance), collective action problems are resolved legally, whilst in integration through voluntary co-ordination (intergovernmental governance), the solution of collective action problems is dependent on national governments' preferences and willingness. Crises are not all the same. They differ not only for their nature and magnitude but also for their ‘cognitive construction’ (Schmidt, 2015). Despite reflecting empirical phenomena, crises are in fact constructed by constellations of political actors successfully mobilising ideas that fit their own interests or views (S. Fabbrini, 2025, Chapter 1.1). In the EU context, the construction of a crisis is conditioned by three main factors. First by the allocation of treaty competences to deal with the crisis. The crises of the 2010s and 2020s here considered (the sovereign debt crisis, the pandemic crisis and the energy and military aid crises induced by the Russian war) exploded in policy fields where national governments had statutory pre-eminence over supranational institutions in terms of competence. What Bojar and Kriesi (2023, p. 431) argued is true, namely, that ‘under crisis conditions of high urgency and uncertainty, executive decision-making is generally likely to become the policymaking mode’. However, because ‘in the multi-level polity of the EU, executive decision-making primarily involves the EU Commission, the European Council, and the governments of the member states’ (Bojar and Kriesi, 2023), the crises here considered prioritised the action of the European Council and national governments rather than the Commission (Zgaga et al., 2023). Second, by the nature of the crisis, that is, by whether the crisis is due to an internal or external chock (i.e., its source is endogenous or exogeneous) and affects some or all the member states (i.e., its impact is asymmetrical or symmetrical). There is no correlation between source and impact of a crisis. Whether the sovereign debt crisis was an endogenous and asymmetric crisis, the pandemic crisis was an exogenous crisis with symmetric effects, the energy crisis had an exogenous origin (the Russian war) but its effects were asymmetric, whilst the security crisis was exogenous (the Russian war) but its effects were mixed, symmetric regarding the military threat (a threat potentially affecting all the EU member states, but faced through another organisation, NATO) and asymmetric regarding the to aid military (a by the than the member of crises thus different for political Third, by the political to a crisis according to a specific or a crisis to the of national governments' that will then be by the of national government as as by the and of the or on these three it is that the crises amongst but they all led to a similar that is, to policy solutions that strengthened the EU intergovernmental logic. a crisis by national will unlikely a supranational solution to because that their power the EU. us and the four crises here considered led to the same governance the strengthening of Those crises, although exploded in the of core state by national thus to the the pre-eminence in dealing with them. no crises in the same period in the regulatory of supranational The sovereign debt crisis in the of the 2010s had a because it the amongst member states regarding the to be to or it but did not the main to a budgetary crisis. Despite a external origin the it was constructed as endogenous by the national of states to the fiscal of member asymmetric member states rather than and the policy member state is for the state of its public the and The sovereign debt crisis the Economic and Union or based on a single and national budgetary policies, although the are highly to their with The solution led to a strengthening of the regulatory in the form of new legal and new intergovernmental the to by the member The policy was It be the national to deal with the crisis, also because the member states did not an of the policy solution a between and members of the and with the of amongst them. The pandemic crisis in and the energy and military aid crises by the Russian in were a to the structure of the EU and not (as with the sovereign debt to amongst member For they can be as crises because they called the policy that has organised the of the EU in policy The magnitude showed the in the based on member to of their from (Schmidt, and the to on national for from the The policy solution the of EU a change of as it on EU debt by the Commission with the This policy however, had not only a (it last but the from the debt were to member states and not by the Certainly, their national governments had to them in with national of and with the Commission and the The Commission the of by national but it not of a of for public (as EU EU and EU health and on the of a supranational up in strengthening the role of national the by showed the in the and adopted by EU member states with the of the In one the Russian out the by European in to and with that that were by The approach of through had to energy with which to its national thus their on the Despite the Russian of and some of in also and the to German of had to in terms on two regimes, for energy and for the same the military security of to be by the to of European Fabbrini, However, to the pandemic that led to a new of policy through the Russian did not change national preferences national and not European to its energy and security was faced with the policy of and the of on a policy that EU member states the same the to the military side of the was to with the EU member states to through and Russian the of and military to the a was by them. The Russian military certainly a collective potentially all the member however, it was constructed as a for than the EU. the EU had no military system of its the about its strategic on the through The EU a European a that was to amongst the various member In security military aid to was thus the only policy the EU through the co-ordination of national governments in the European Council, thus strengthening the intergovernmental of policy were reached through in and views amongst national the of national governments (with the of the on 15 by the as as on through the intergovernmental of the European and then the supranational of the for with the the policy co-ordination adopted for not not only because no national for EU solutions to the energy and security problems but also because national had to primarily the interests of their and not to of the EU as the of was confirmed by the sovereign debt crisis and was by the the energy and security of the Russian of it the different source and impact of the crises, intergovernmentalism its various tight as in the fiscal policy or loose as in the energy the governance for both and In all crises, national governments pre-eminence in of supranational institutions and Kriesi, although they the for their The European Council as the where the solutions to the crises were not only as the for the crises in the The EU new and but they did not its supranational Indeed, the policy solutions of the poly-crises had the of the policy-making role of national In the sovereign debt crisis, successfully constructed as endogenous and asymmetric, the European Council the of the national of the member states of the had the over with the of the and of the or the the terms of and was by the states, The solution to the crisis by the national government of the led to the strengthening of intergovernmental governance, also to the intergovernmental the EU. However, the Council, which according to a of not crises which and the sovereign debt crisis, the European Council was for decisions that were and too a the of and then the nature of intergovernmental governance to give to power the of a crisis, of over constructed as a crisis, the intergovernmental decision-making process up in for some and for other member outcome the EP to in the decision-making process, was as by the (the of the The policy solution adopted for the sovereign debt crisis (defined as intergovernmentalism because it the of Fabbrini and a in all the the system since a of European and the successfully constructed as exogenous and an intergovernmental solution to although the European Council was the of the decision-making process (Fabbrini, 2023). Moreover, some national (the German and European had the effects of that approach of policy As no one be for the the crisis was as a common threat that a common to with through (S. Fabbrini, 2025, p. different about the crisis, between of member states, as also in such as the 2023), however, the was rather than of the magnitude of the and the of interests between member states, the European Council had to (or to a role by the to the for by amongst states to the Commission had to in as the for their thus their the by the to the various national it was necessary to new for the and of national through the This is a consisting of and by the of the EU and of its members states as as by own new only the by the Commission and the Council, the of the European Council of the power of The supranationalism of the however, in terms of (the will in institutional (the EP had no decision-making role to and logic (the acquired are to member states and not by supranational might that it is a supranationalism the of national are the of the The is by the Commission with the national where the Commission not have the power to its own policies. a new form of policy, as supranationalism and 2023). the the EU was given an fiscal (Fabbrini, however, it is dependent on national governments' not the for dealing with new with the For that the European Council and national governments their decision-making although they had to on action by the Commission the to common the initiative, the European Council has the of 15 of by the government their However, the to the on Russian led to on to its since national policies on energy of the of the which state some national governments with their own policies to and in the energy On November the for a of by the Commission as state two member states for the of the for and for The policy solution adopted the of action of national the between that had fiscal for their and and other by high public The intergovernmental of national policy co-ordination has thus further the EU energy the policy solution for military to up member states to but then asked to be as they were new of the based on new and amongst national governments to new with the in the of military the European Council had to the Commission to become a common for thus with the that with the of the European the lead of the The due to their of of the member states led the Commission to a new to aid but only for by European debt in the same as the the to up a consisting of over years out of the of the was by the veto during the European Council of since the of the European Council for other national governments were to give too much for to the the amongst member states regarding the military aid to with some national governments (as and to much and than they were to the European Council to the policy co-ordination its different national governments for national not EU) solutions to their energy and security also because they were by the energy crisis and by the to (a in the than in the member the sovereign debt crisis further strengthened the intergovernmental and the Russian the on national the pandemic crisis the possibility for national governments to to a European a forward for although the debt was by national governments and not supranational In all the crises, the European Council as the of the EU decision-making process, and the policy solutions it to the crises further strengthened its decision-making as argued by the (Bickerton et al., The Russian was by the of national governments as a threat that and not the EU, Indeed, the Russian led to the strengthening of also through its to and traditionally Despite the on and by and as as by of the Treaty on European Union or the EU to on the to the security of the that after the Russian the European Council approved a by the which the of a European of governments to on military the security of because that them to of their national military policy, although that is than Indeed, in the various national governments the of in they in national and not EU defence, with the of the amongst the various national of the by the German of to be on Certainly, it was a or in German policy the 2023), but it was not a towards a supranational EU Indeed, it is likely that asymmetric it takes will in other EU member states, which will be to through intergovernmental In the crises that in a by 27 national intergovernmental governance a common for dealing with a crisis because of the of interests and views between national Certainly, supranationalism was taken further than the Treaties of Rome The regulatory powers of the Commission, by the EP after have much what Monnet Those powers of integration through law have the single market in the much than the the role in a single market was prefigured in the Rome is not the of the EP, whose decision-making role has after It is to that the decision-making role of national governments the European Council) has not only by the new policy with the Maastricht Treaty but also by the to the European Council and EP, both in their form in the Rome have in as one had to the This has the of the governance only has supranational governance become the decision-making for the single but intergovernmental governance has also institutionalised to a by its the 1992 governance is that the EU, in dealing with crises affecting national core state as an of The of two different governance regimes on whether the EU will to be a political As as the Lisbon Treaty in the EU had to a of crises that the institutional structure by that Treaty. to the of its internal and external the EU crises, showing that it has institutional However, to the of its internal and external the EU showed that it was to rather than to 2023). the crises exploded in the of core state they were by national governments and led to policy solutions that strengthened intergovernmental crises were through the European Council, whose led to an intergovernmental solution to the sovereign debt crisis, to a supranational solution to the pandemic crisis and policy co-ordination amongst national governments for the energy and security crises induced by the Russian of Moreover, the decision-making of the European Council also the internal of the the of the Commission is a member of the European Council, with to the logic of national Commission was the for its to with national as as with the European Council with the during an to emerge between the European Council and the Commission, or between their to in or of the of interests and amongst national intergovernmental governance not the of collective decision-making process based on the of 27 national to be and Moreover, the European Commission is by the (the Council and the the European Council is not to and the which it during the its members decisions in an 2015). In fact, national the of their or the European Council as an executive is not by a legislative (the the same The EU has moved in of an intergovernmental different from the supranational one that over the of the single Indeed, also because of the veto power to national the European Council) and national the and affairs during the crises, the EU as an organisation, which is not to the of rather than as the supranational in the 1957 Rome Treaties in the on the supranational governance a form of of powers that the of the is unlikely by intergovernmental governance, where national and from the collective will of the by their decisions (S. Fabbrini, 2025, Chapter The article has the further intergovernmental of EU during the poly-crises of the 2010s and although it has also the of intergovernmentalism in terms of to Jean one might thus that it is that ‘Europe will be forged in crises and will be the sum of the solutions adopted for these then the poly-crises of the 2010s and 2020s have strengthened the intergovernmental rather than the supranational of the EU. Monnet the crises in the single when on the process of integration, not the crises in core state power policies. a of with the of the two different logics of by as of the