Selection through information acquisition in coordination games
实验研究了在信息不完全的协调博弈中，成本高昂的信息获取如何作为选择机制，发现高精度选择导致更多协调尝试和更可预测的策略，且这种效应源于个体偏好的异质性而非策略性预期。
Abstract We investigate experimentally the role of costly information acquisition as a selection mechanism in coordination games with incomplete information. We find that subjects’ behavior, conditional on their precision choice, varies along two dimensions. Higher precision choices lead to more coordination attempts (and successful coordination) and more predictable strategies than low precision choices. These differences in behavior are absent when information precision is exogenous, suggesting that information choices act as a selection device. We find that individual precision choices are stable and unaffected by others’ past precision choices from the beginning of the experiment, suggesting that that selection is not driven by strategic anticipation but rather by unobserved heterogeneity in subjects’ preferences. We show that these effects have significant payoff consequences.