Judicial venality in Old Regime France: A rational choice analysis
研究了16至18世纪法国司法领域官职买卖制度，通过模型分析其兴起与衰落，指出该制度虽增强了法律能力，但因司法失控导致高成本审判，最终在1789年革命中终结。
Venality, i.e., the sale of public positions, was widely used in the judicial sector in France between the 16th and 18th centuries. In a venal system, litigants finance the justice system by paying the judges directly. In France, moreover, the right to judge was sold by the ruler, who indirectly levied part of the legal costs. Here, instead of the state funding justice, justice funds the state. The cost to the King was a loss of control over the judiciary and biased legal decisions. We develop a model of judicial venality and build on this model to provide an analytical narrative of the rise and decline of judicial venality in Old Regime France. Historically, judicial venality enhanced legal capacity whereas the French kings faced with limited opportunities to raise taxes and to borrow. Lack of control over the judiciary, however, led to overly costly and time-consuming trials, resulting in its final demise during the 1789 Revolution.