An extension of May’s Theorem to three alternatives: axiomatizing Minimax voting
将梅定理从两选项扩展到三选项，通过添加避免破坏者效应和强不参与悖论等公理，证明任何满足这些公理的偏好投票方法必须选择极小化极大胜者。
Abstract May’s Theorem [K. O. May, Econometrica 20 (1952) 680-684] characterizes majority voting on two alternatives as the unique preferential voting method satisfying several simple axioms. Here we show that by adding some desirable axioms to May’s axioms, we can uniquely determine how to vote on three alternatives (setting aside tiebreaking). In particular, we add two axioms stating that the voting method should mitigate spoiler effects and the so-called strong no show paradox . We prove a theorem stating that any preferential voting method satisfying our enlarged set of axioms, which includes some weak homogeneity and preservation axioms, must choose from among the Minimax winners in all three-alternative elections. When applied to more than three alternatives, our axioms also distinguish Minimax from other known voting methods that coincide with or refine Minimax for three alternatives.