Projects with uncertain requirements and deadlines
研究团队在连续时间下面对不确定目标和截止日期的动态道德风险问题，分析了均衡和最优努力路径，揭示了搭便车、最后一刻冲刺和过去努力效应三种机制。
Abstract I analyze a dynamic moral hazard problem in teams with imperfect monitoring in continuous time. In the model, players work together to achieve a breakthrough in a project while facing a deadline. The target effort needed to achieve a breakthrough is unknown, but the players have a common prior about its distribution. I characterize the equilibrium and the effort path that maximizes the team’s welfare for general distributions of this target effort and show that three effects are at work: free-riding (i.e., working less), last-minute rush (i.e., working later), and a past-effort effect (i.e., working more if others worked more in the past). This past-effort effect increases or decreases the amount of work players put into the project, depending on the type of project faced.