Coordination in a two-sided market entry game with endogenous capacity: an experimental investigation
通过实验室实验研究双边市场进入博弈中的协调行为，发现双方进入意愿和跨边网络效应显著影响协调，帕累托占优均衡可通过隐性协调实现，但单边帕累托占优时易出现协调失败。
Abstract We propose a two-sided market entry game and present experiments studying coordination behavior in the game. The two-sided market in the game is operated by an intermediary monopoly platform, serving two sides (i.e., customers and service providers) and featuring asymmetric agents, cross-side network effects, and endogenous market capacity. The game has multiple pure-strategy Nash equilibria if at least one side has a high willingness to enter the market and the other side’s willingness is not very low. We conduct a laboratory experiment involving three treatments corresponding to different combinations of willingness to enter the market among customers and service providers. The experimental results indicate that willingness to enter the market and cross-side network effects significantly influence coordination behavior in two-sided markets. When the multiple pure-strategy Nash equilibria are Pareto ranked on both sides, customers and service providers can coordinate their behavior to the payoff-dominant equilibrium via tacit coordination under strategic uncertainty. However, when the multiple pure-strategy Nash equilibria are Pareto ranked on one side but Pareto equivalent on the other side, coordination failure and disequilibrium occurred, and the equilibria cannot predict the aggregate behavior well. Our experimental results indicate that a thriving two-sided market should coordinate both sides on board.