The Consequences of Political Hierarchy: Evidence From Chinese SOEs
利用1998-2013年中国国有企业九级政治层级数据，发现低层级国企生产率比私企高14%，支持地方政府保护理论，并指出增长收益可能使地方政府抵制中央改革。
ABSTRACT Using a comprehensive dataset containing a detailed nine‐level political hierarchy classification for all state‐owned enterprises (SOEs) in China from 1998 to 2013, we find that low‐ranked SOEs have 14% higher productivity than private firms. The result is robust to propensity score matching, instrumental variable approach, and within‐firm analysis. Further findings lend support to the theory of local government's protection as opposed to local information advantage. Macro‐level results suggest that growth benefits might lead local government to resist the central government reform of ending low‐ranked SOEs.