CEO power and post-merger performance in the UK: the moderating effects of corporate governance mechanisms
研究英国上市公司CEO权力对并购后绩效的负面影响，并发现董事会规模、独立性和性别多样性等治理机制能缓解这一负面效应，但无法完全消除。
Abstract This study examines the effects of Chief Executive Officer (CEO) power and the moderating role of corporate governance mechanisms on mergers and acquisitions (M&A) performance. Our results indicate that CEO power is negatively associated with post-merger performance. Further tests show that corporate governance mechanisms, namely—board size, board independence, and board gender diversity—moderate the negative effects of CEO power on M&A performance. These results imply that internal corporate governance mechanisms may be effective in curtailing CEO power but do not curb it completely. The results are robust across alternative model specifications and alternative measures of post-merger performance.