Information Transparency of Firm Financing
提出最优金融契约信息透明度的理论，模型包含逆向选择和代理成本，发现三种内生契约类型（股权、透明债务、不透明债务），并分析均衡特征。
Abstract We propose a theory on information transparency of optimal financial contracts. Our model nests adverse selection and agency cost. There exists a unique perfect Bayesian equilibrium with novel features: First, three types of optimal contracts can arise endogenously, that is, equity, transparent debt, and opaque debt. The former two require firms to take on a costly verification technology while opaque debt does not. Second, the unique equilibrium is either pooling on opaque debt, or mixing with transparent and opaque financing. Third, firms with sufficiently high quality and intermediate levels of internal funds find it optimal to use a transparent contract.