Fiscal Distress and Banking Performance: The Role of Macroprudential Regulation
研究了财政脆弱性如何影响银行系统，发现当财政弱国允许银行资本要求最优调整时，主权违约风险与银行违约风险的正相关关系会逆转，从而支撑银行体系并提高产出和福利。
Abstract Fiscal fragility undermines a government's ability to honor its bank deposit insurance pledge and induces a positive correlation between sovereign default risk and financial (bank) default risk. We show that this positive relation is reversed if bank capital requirements in fiscally weak countries are allowed to adjust optimally. The resulting higher requirements buttress the banking system and support higher output and welfare relative to the case where macroprudential policy does not vary with the degree of fiscal stress. Fiscal tenuousness also exacerbates the effects of other risk shocks. Nonetheless, the economy's response can be mitigated if macroprudential policy is adjusted optimally.