Information Systems, Service Delivery, and Corruption: Evidence From the Bangladesh Civil Service
通过向孟加拉国公务员发送月度服务交付延迟评分卡，发现信息系统使准时服务交付提升11%，但未减少贿赂，反而因声誉约束放松导致高绩效官员受贿增加。
Slow public service delivery and corruption are common problems in low- and middle-income countries. Can better management information systems improve delivery speed? Does improving the delivery speed reduce corruption? In a large-scale experiment with the Bangladesh Civil Service, I send monthly scorecards measuring delays in service delivery to government officials and their supervisors. The scorecards increase on-time service delivery by 11 percent but do not reduce bribes. Instead, the scorecards increase bribes for high-performing bureaucrats. A model where bureaucrats' reputational concerns constrain bribes can explain the results. When positive performance feedback improves bureaucrats' reputations, the constraint is relaxed, and bribes increase.