Preferences, Selection, and the Structure of Teacher Pay
通过离散选择实验研究教师对薪酬要素和工作条件的偏好，发现高效教师更偏好绩效工资，并分析最优薪酬结构以提升教师福利和学生成绩。
I examine teacher preferences using a discrete-choice experiment linked to data on teacher effectiveness. I estimate willingness to pay for a rich set of compensation elements and working conditions. Highly effective teachers usually have the same preferences as their peers, but they have stronger preferences for performance pay. I use the preference estimates to investigate the optimal compensation structure for three key objectives: maximizing teacher utility, maximizing teacher retention, and maximizing student achievement. Under each objective, schools underutilize salary and performance pay while overutilizing retirement benefits. Restructuring compensation can significantly improve both teacher welfare and student achievement.