The Effect of Sanction Target on Managers’ Compliance with Regulations
通过经济实验研究监管制裁针对个人还是组织对管理者合规决策的影响，发现针对个人的制裁反而降低合规性，而针对组织的制裁则无此负面效果。
ABSTRACT Regulators use sanctions to deter managers of organizations from harmful conduct. Regulatory sanctions sometimes target individual violating managers but sometimes target entire violating organizations. We use an economic experiment to study the effect of targeting individuals versus entire organizations on managers’ compliance decisions, both of which are compared to a condition with no sanctions. Leveraging theories on social norms and distributive fairness, we predict that managers will become less compliant when sanctions target individuals compared with no sanctions. However, firm-targeted sanctions do not reduce compliance, even if the monetary value of the sanction on the manager is the same across both conditions. Our results suggest that managers react to sanctions for social motivations and the effects are not always as intended. Data Availability: Data are available upon request. JEL Classifications: K20; K40; M48.