Efficient and strategy-proof multi-unit object allocation problems with money: decreasing incremental valuations with income effects
研究了在非拟线性偏好下，分配多单位物品并收取付款时，同时满足效率、个体理性、对输家无补贴和防策略性的规则不存在性，揭示了准线性假设的必要性。
We consider the problem of allocating multiple units of an object and collecting payments. Each agent can receive multiple units, and his (consumption) bundle is a pair consisting of his quantity of the object and his payment. An agent’s preference over bundles is not necessarily quasi-linear. A class of preferences is called a domain. We show that if a sufficiently rich domain includes at least one preference exhibiting decreasing incremental valuations and either positive or negative income effects, then no rule satisfies efficiency , individual rationality , no subsidy for losers , and strategy-proofness . Our result demonstrates the necessity of certain assumptions for the existence of a rule satisfying the four properties in various environments-for instance, the quasi-linearity assumption is necessary for the classical existence result under quasi-linear preferences with non-increasing incremental valuations (Vickrey 1961 ).