Money and imperfectly competitive credit
研究了银行因搜索摩擦拥有市场势力时，存款和贷款利率的分布如何呈现分散性，并解释了货币政策不完全传导至利率分布的新渠道，以及市场势力对消费和福利的影响。
We develop a monetary economy in which banks have market power emanating from search frictions. Distributions of both deposit and loan interest rates are equilibrium phenomena exhibiting dispersion consistent with new micro-level evidence on U.S. consumer loans and deposits. The theory accounts for incomplete pass-through of monetary policy to the distributions of loan and deposit rates through a novel channel. Imperfect competition links monetary policy to real consumption and welfare through its effects on interest rate spreads driven by market power and individual liquidity risk. Market power in deposits erodes the insurance banks provide against liquidity risk, while market power in lending enables banks to extract surplus from goods market trades. For a given inflation target, welfare gains arise if a central bank uses state-contingent monetary injections to reduce lenders' market power in response to fluctuations in aggregate demand.