Mechanisms for Belief Elicitation Without Ground Truth
这篇综述研究了在无法验证信息真伪时，如何设计机制激励多人如实报告信念，回顾了25种以上机制及其实证效果，发现多数机制理论上可行但实证证据有限，建议开发更简单直观的机制以便测试和应用。
ABSTRACT This review article examines the challenge of eliciting truthful information from multiple individuals when such information cannot be verified, a problem known as “information elicitation without verification.” This article reviews over 25 mechanisms designed to incentivize truth‐telling in such scenarios and their effectiveness in empirical studies. Although many mechanisms theoretically ensure truthfulness as a Bayesian Nash equilibrium, empirical evidence regarding the effects of mechanisms on truth‐telling is limited and generally weak. Consequently, more empirical research is needed to validate mechanisms. However, empirical validation is difficult because most mechanisms are very complex and cannot be easily conveyed to research subjects. This review suggests that simple and intuitive mechanisms may be easier to empirically test and apply.