Endogenous Clustering and Analogy-Based Expectation Equilibrium
研究玩家如何将对手行为分类以最小化预测误差，形成基于类比的预期均衡，并解释信念异质性和均衡多重性。
Abstract Normal-form two-player games are categorized by players into K analogy classes so as to minimize the prediction error about the behaviour of the opponent. This results in Clustered Analogy-Based Expectation Equilibria in which strategies are analogy-based expectation equilibria given the analogy partitions and analogy partitions minimize the prediction errors given the strategies. We distinguish between environments with self-repelling analogy partitions in which some mixing over partitions is required and environments with self-attractive partitions in which several analogy partitions can arise, thereby suggesting new channels of belief heterogeneity and equilibrium multiplicity. Various economic applications are discussed.