Unidirectional incentive compatibility
研究了代理人只能单向谎报私人信息时的激励相容条件，发现其对分配规则无限制，仅要求信息租金变化满足基于分配规则单调包络的下界。在垄断筛选模型中，最优合同可能不同于双向激励相容情形，出现非单调分配。
We study unidirectional incentive compatibility which incentivizes an agent to report truthfully when she can misrepresent private information in one direction only. In the canonical setting with continuous, one-dimensional private information, and quasi-linear utility, unidirectional incentive compatibility imposes no restrictions on the allocation rule and holds if and only if the change of the agent’s information rent function respects a lower bound that is based on the allocation rule’s monotone envelope. In monopolistic screening models with strong interdependent values or with countervailing incentives, optimal contracts differ from optimal bidirectionally incentive compatible contracts, possibly displaying non-monotone allocations.