The social benefit of being destructive: entrepreneurship and loan diversion
研究信贷成本如何影响创业者挪用贷款从事非正规活动，发现高比例潜在挪用者时市场更可能有效，利率上限政策可改善效率但效果受限于非正规投资回报。
This paper analyzes the effect of credit costs on the entrepreneurial choice to engage in informal activities. Unlike previous studies, which mainly focus on the decision to divert business assets, we present a model where some entrepreneurs may have the incentive to divert part of the business loan received to illegal or personal uses, rather than investing it in the formal project. We first show that the equilibrium is more likely to be efficient when there is a relatively large proportion of potential diverters. In the case of inefficiency, a regulatory intervention can be welfare improving, but the cost and desirability of the policy depend on whether the proceeds from diversion are classified as a contribution to social welfare or not. The informal sector is often analyzed as a response to high taxes and strict regulation. This paper highlights the role of credit costs in driving participation in the informal sector and shows that information asymmetries and excessive credit burden can be crucial in pushing individuals toward the dark side of entrepreneurship. Policy measures, in the form of an interest rate cap, can restore efficiency. However, when informal investments are more profitable than formal ones, the effectiveness of such interventions may be limited, and informality could even be socially desirable.