Hybrid choice systems in small-n elections with sophisticated electorates
本文回顾了为应对投票悖论而提出的混合投票系统，如Condorcet-Borda和Borda-Balinski混合系统，并指出这些系统无法摆脱其母系统的已知缺陷，例如Borda系统违反无关选项独立性。
Abstract Faced with the classic paradoxes of voting, system designers have sometimes offered hybrid systems. The paper reviews Condorcet–Borda hybrids proposed by Daunou, Dodgson, Nanson, and Kemeny; and Borda-Balinski hybrids in use in at least one scientific academy. The justification of the hybrids is practical rather than theoretical, as they cannot escape the known features of their parent systems. In particular, as Condorcet showed in 1788, all Borda systems violate independence of irrelevant alternatives (in some formulation).