Monetary and Macroprudential Policies under Dollar‐Denominated Foreign Debt
研究一个借入美元外债的小型开放经济体中，汇率贬值如何通过国际收支调整放大外债负担并引发危机，以及最优政策组合（事前宏观审慎税与事后紧缩货币政策）如何应对过度借贷与危机。
Abstract This paper studies monetary and macroprudential policies in a small open economy that borrows from abroad in foreign currency. The model features a novel mechanism in which exchange rate depreciation triggered by a borrowing constraint is amplified through balance of payments adjustments, increasing the real burden of foreign debt and causing crises. This mechanism induces overborrowing in normal times and excessive imports during crises. While contractionary monetary policy during crises mitigates depreciation, anticipation of such interventions exacerbates overborrowing ex ante . The optimal policy combines ex ante macroprudential taxes to correct overborrowing and ex post contractionary monetary policy to mitigate depreciation.